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PRIVATE CONSENSUAL HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: THE
CRIME AND ITS ENFORCEMENT*
A POLICE officer, without revealing his identity, telephoned Rittenour, a
suspected homosexual, and requested an invitation to his home. Once inside,
the officer led Rittenour to believe that he would 'agree to homosexual activ-
ities,1 and after a few minutes, Rittenour touched the officer's genitals. The
policeman then identified himself and arrested Rittenour, who was indicted
and convicted for violating section 22-1112(a) of the District of Columbia
Code:
It shall not be lawful for any person or persons to make any obscene or
indecent exposure of his or her person, or to make any lewd, obscene,
or indecent sexual proposal, or to commit any other lewd, obscene, or
indecent act in the District of Columbia ....
This conviction was reversed by the Municipal Court of. Appeals. The court
recognized that there are at least three separate classes of sexual behavior to
which criminal sanctions might be applied: public acts, private acts involving
a nonconsenting party, and private consensual acts. It held that only the first
two classes were covered by the statute.3 Since the officer implied a willing-
ness to consent,4 and since Rittenour's act occurred in the privacy of his own
home, the alleged offense fell within the third category and was not criminal.5
This holding made it unnecessary to determine whether the conduct of the
police officer constituted "entrapment." The case thus presents two major
issues-whether criminal sanctions should be applied to homosexual conduct,
and, if so, what limitations should be placed on police administration of such
laws.
Section 22-1112 contains no express exception for consensual private con-
duct. Moreover, it is broader in scope than the preceding District of Columbia
statute, which prohibited only indecent exposure, and then only if committed
*Rittenour v. District of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1960).
1. The officer told Rittenour that he was "down and out" and that he had learned of
Rittenour's "place of business" at the bus terminal. Id. at 559.
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1112(a) (Supp. VIII, 1960).
3. Rittenour v. District ofColumbia, 163 A.2d 558, 559 (D.C. Muiic. Ct. App. 1960).
4. For a discussion of the doctrine of implied consent see Puttkammer, Consent In
Crin imul Assault, 19 ILL. L. IEv. 617, 628 n.40 (1925). The defendant is entitled to acquit-
'tal if the "conduct of the [victim'] towards him ... was of such nature'as to create in his
mind the honest and reasonable belief that [the victim] had consented." MvfcQuirk v. StAte,
84 Ala. 435, 437, 4 So. 775, 776 (1888) ;. accord, Gordon v. State, 26 So. 2d 419 (Ala. App.
1946) ; Chambless v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 1, 79 S.W. 577 (1904). The District of Columbia
courts have applied this test to police provocateurs in other homosexual crimes where
consent vitiated the offense. See Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(indecent assault) ; McDermett v. United States, 98 A.2d 287 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953)
(same).
5. 163 A.2d at 560.
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in a public or potentially public place. 6 However, the Rittenour court's inter-
pretation of the statute is supported by the common-law background of the
crime involved and its early statutory history in this country. Although the
early cases did not concern homosexual behavior, they dealt with the same
concept of lewdness that was involved in Rittenour. At common law, lewd
and indecent conduct was considered a nuisance and punished as a mis-
demeanor.7 Such behavior was indictable, however, only when "open and no-
torious ... grossly scandalous and public .... *8 Sanctions were justified, not
because lewd acts harmed the participants, but because they caused conster-
nation and were "injurious to public morals."9 The common-law's emphasis
on public behavior 10 led several commentators to conclude that an act had to
be seen by more than one person to be criminal."
6. It shall not be lawful for any person.. . to make any obscene or indecent exposure
of his or her person ... in any street ... or other public place or inclosure, in the
District of Columbia, or to make any such obscene or indecent exposure of person
in any dwelling or ...other place wherefrom the same may be seen in any street
*.. open space, public square, or public or private building or inclosure ....
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1112(a) (1951). In enacting the present statute, Congress stated it
was intended to cover "acts occurring anywhere in the District." H.R. REP. No. 514, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4 (1954).
7. 1 RUSSELL, CRIMES 326 (Greaves ed. 1853) [hereinafter cited as RUSSELL]; 2
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1703 (12th ed. 1932) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON];
Brooks v. State, 10 Tenn. 482, 483 (1831).
8. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 85 (Hammond ed. 1890); accord, 2 WHARTON
§ 1703; 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 3 (1806) ; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 965,
971-72, 146 S.E. 289, 291 (1929) (dictum) ; Delany v. People, 10 Mich. 241, 243 (1862)
Brooks v. State, note 7 supra, at 483.
9. 1 RUSSELL 326; DESTY, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW § 109(a) (1882) [hereinafter
cited as DESTY] ; 3 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME § 962 (1946) ; PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW
138, 157 (1951) [hereinafter cited as PLOSCOWE]; State v. Moore, 31 Tenn. 136, 137
(1851).
10. 2 WHARTON § 1703 ("mere private lewdness or indecency is not indictable . . .at
common-law") ; 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 501 (9th ed. 1923) ; DESTY § 113(b) ; State
v. Moore, note 9 supra, at 137.
11. E.g., DESTY § 109; Fowler v. State, 5 Conn. 81, 84 (1811) (dictum) ; see DRZAGA,
SEX CRIMES 30-31 (1960) ; STEPHEN, CRIMINAL LAW § 171 (1878) ("uncertain" whether
one nonconsenter is sufficient) ; State v. Millard, 18 Vt. 574, 576 (1846) (same).
This requirement is illustrated by the history of a particular act of lewdness-indecent
exposure. To be indictable at early common-law this act not only had to be public, but had
to actually be seen by more than one nonconsenting person. E.g., Regina v. Watson, [18471
2 Cox Crim. Cas. 376; Regina v. Orchard, [1848] 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 248. The "more than
one person" rule was soon relaxed to the extent that acts were held indictable if they were
committed in a place "so situated that what passes there can be seen by a considerable
number of people if they happen to look." Van Houten v. State, 5 N.J.L. 311 (Essex
Quarter Sess., 1882), aff'd, 46 N.J.L. 16 (Sup. Ct. 1884) (store); accord, Regina v.
Holmes [1853] 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 216 (omnibus); Regina v. Thallman [1863] 9 Cox
Crim. Cas. 388 (roof). However courts retaining this modified requirement have still re-
fused to indict the act when committed in private before a single nonconsenting person.
E.g., Lockhart v. State, 116 Ga. 557, 42 S.E. 787 (1902) ; State v. Wolf, 211 Mo. App.
429, 244 S.W. 962 (1922) ; see 3 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIMES § 967 (1946).
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The crime and its common-law rationale were adopted at an early period by
American legislatures. Early statutes condemned "open" lewdness 12 in order
to prevent "examples, tending to corrupt the public morals."' 13 Application of
these statutes did result in some expansion of the common-law crime. The
early statutes were construed to prohibit not only public acts, but also secret
behavior to which one party did not assent.' 4 Similarly, indecent exposure
committed in a private place was held to be "open" if seen by one nonconsent-
ing person. 5 Even conduct between consenting parties in normally private
places was sometimes considered "open" if reasonable care had not been taken
to avoid discovery.' 6 The early statutes were not extended, however, to encom-
pass secret consensual behavior.' 7 Since the act in Rittenour was neither
"open" nor nonconsensual, it would not have been criminal either at common
law or under the early American statutes.
More recently, however, twenty-one states have adopted statutes which, like
section 22-1112, lack any express requirement of "openness."' Two courts
have held that private consensual conduct is indictable under these statutes,
one expressly applying such a statute to private consensual homosexual be-
havior. 19 Whether Rittenour was correct in adopting the historic definition of
the crime, rather than following these two decisions, must depend in part upon
the policy justifications for invoking criminal sanctions against private volun-
tary homosexual activities.
12. E.g., Mass. Stat. 1784, ch. 40, § 3 ("open and gross lewdness") ; Vt. Rev. Stat.
1839, ch. 99, § 8 (same).
13. State v. Calef, 10 Mass. 152 (1823) ; accord, State v. Chandler, 132 Mo. 155, 164,
33 S.W. 797, 799 (1896) ; State v. Brooks, 215 Wis. 134, 254 N.W. 374 (1934) ; State v.
Smith, 98 N.H. 149, 95 A.2d 789 (1953); see Commonwealth v. Wardell, 128 Mass. 52
(1880) (public consternation) ; State v. Juneau, 88 Wis. 180, 59 N.W. 580 (1894) (same).
14. Fowler v. State, 5 Conn. 81 (1811).
15. Commonwealth v. Wardell, 128 Mass. 52 (1880); State v. Millard, 18 Vt. 574
(1846) ; State v. Juneau, 88 Wis. 180, 59 N.W. 580 (1894). Compare cases cited in note 11
supra.
16. Compare State v. Sellinger, 272 S.W. 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) (act done in home
with lights on, shades up, door open held indictable), with Commonwealth v. Catlin, 1
Mass. 7 (1804) (witness peeked through broken pane into darkened, locked room held not
indictable).
17. Commonwealth v. Catlin, 1 Mass. 7 (1804); Delaney v. People, 10 Mich. 241
(1862) ; State v. Franzoni, 100 Vt. 373, 137 At. 465 (1927) ; State v. Mulhern, 133 Me.
351, 177 At. 705 (1935) ; State v. Parker, 233 Mo. App. 1037, 128 S.W.2d 288 (1939);
State v. Metie, 269 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
18. See Appendix.
19. State v. Curtis, 146 Conn. 365, 151 A.2d 336 (1959) (court refused to read open-
ness into statute) ; State v. Michalis, 99 N.J.L. 31, 122 Atl. 538 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (homo-
sexuals) ; cf. Dillard v. State, 226 Ark. 720, 293 S.W.2d 697 (1956). (act in motel);
Landrum v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 356, 255 P.2d 525 (1953) (act in business office as-
sumed to be "open"). The Michatis holding was restricted in State v. White, 129 N.J.L.
200, 28 A.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (indictment alleging private act without mentioning
presence of another person held insufficient). But see Rex v. Clifford, 35 Ont. L. Rep. 287,
26 D.L.R. 754 (1916) (indictment averring consensual homosexual act committed in place
contemplated by statute held insufficient; statute silent about lack of consent),
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One view is that the criminal law should correspond to "behavioral ideals"
and enforce the moral judgments of the community.20 Despite the difficulty of
ascertaining these moral standards for many other questions,21 homosexual
conduct would be criminal if this viewpoint prevailed.Y2 To the extent that
this view rests on a moral imperative that "wrong" must always be punished,
it defies further analysis. The precept, however, can be examined pragmatically.
Thus, it has been argued that a general moral code is essential to society's
existence, and that the criminal law should be an instrument of moral educa-
tion.23 On the other hand, it is not clear that every moral norm expressed by
a society is essential to its existence. 24 Nor does it necessarily follow that all
those standards which are essential can or should be reinforced by the criminal
law. The extent to which the criminal law effectively reinforces moral values
has not -been empirically ascertained.2 5 Moreover, some authorities have con-
tended that true morality is internal, and that therefore it cannot be instilled
by fear of criminal sanctions.26 They further argue that attempts to do so may
foster rebellion 27 and create the impression that "the individual's part is limited
20. Schwartz, Book Review, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 914, 915 (1948) ; Ludwig, Control of
the Sex Criminal, 25 ST. JOHNS L. RxV. 203, 209 (1951) ; see Morals and the Law, 101
SOL. J. 751 (1957) ; cf. Crime and Sin, 224 LAW TIMEs 283, 284 (1957).
21. See Cohen, Robson & Bates, Ascertaining the Moral Sense of the Community, 8
J. LEGAL En. 137 (1955) ; Blum & Kalven, The Art of Opinion Research: A Lawyer's
Appraisal of an Emerging Science, 24 U. Cr. L. REv. 1, 5-12 (1956) ; Repouille v. United
States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
22. Although the public today may be more tolerant of this behavior, CHESSER, LIVE
AND LET LIvE 9-16 (1958) [hereinafter cited as CHESSER] ; cf. Glueck, An Evaluation of
the Homosexual Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 187, 193 (1957), it is still regarded as im-
moral, see Bowman & Engle, A Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Homosexuality, 29
TEMPLE L.Q. 273, 305 (1956) ; Bailey, The Homosexual and Christian Morals, in REES
& UsiLL, THEY STAND APART 40 (1955) ; CHURCH OF ENGLAND MORAL WELFARE COUN-
CIL, SEXUAL OFFENDERS AND SOCIAL PUNISHMENT 17, 38 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
CHURCH OF ENGLAND REPORT] ; PLoSCOWE 195, 196, and many strongly oppose any weaken-
ing of existing criminal sanctions against it, see CHESSER 13.
23. See DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 8 (Maccabaean Lecture, London,
1959) [hereinafter cited as DEVLIN]; KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 546 (1952
ed.) ; Ludwig, note 20 supra; see authorities quoted in Waite, The Legal Approach to
Crime and Correction, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 594, 597 (1958).
24. Hart, Immorality and Treasoit, The Listener, July 30, 1959, p. 162, at 163:
Everything to which moral vetoes of accepted morality attach [is not] of equal
importance; nor is there the slightest reason for thinking of morality as a seamless
,. eb, one which will fall into pieces unless all its emphatic vetoes are enforced by
law.
See also Wollheim, Crime, Sin, and Mr. Justice Devlin, Encounter, Nov. 1959, p. 38;
EDWARDS, WHAT IS UNLAWFUL? 3 (1959) [hereinafter cited as EDWARDS].
25. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visi-
bility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 570 n.54 (1960).
26. See Crime and Sin, 109 L.J. 311 (1959) ; Carrington, The Moral Quality of the
Crim;inal Law, 54 Nw. L. REv. 575, 579-83 (1959).




to the evasion of detection." Thus, the enforcement-of-morals approach has
been criticized for ignoring the Anglo-American concept of the individual as
an autonomous entity.29
The enforcement-of-morals approach cannot be evaluated on the basis of this
one factor alone. Whatever the social interest in a strongly enforced moral
code, a complete view of society's interest in this area must also include an
analysis of the extent to which criminal sanctions can actually deter such con-
duct, and the undesirable consequences which may be caused by attempted
deterrence. Moreover, as in any limitation of individual freedom; the nature
of the restriction upon the individual must be weighed.30 The real question is
thus the old and familiar one of striking a balance between social and individ-
ual interests.3'
The individual liberty involved in the restriction of homosexual conduct is
a serious and delicate one. Criminal sanctions represent interference with the
sexual habits of adult members of society, the expression of a "fundamental,
vital impulse."'32 Invocation of the criminal law in this area must meet the
serious objection made by many observers:
[T]here is a sacred realm of privacy for every man . .. where he makes
his choice and decisions, fashions his character and directs his desires, a
realm of his own essential rights and liberties, including, in the providence
of God, liberty to go to the devil, into which the law, generally speaking,
must not intrude.33
Such behavior, therefore, should be prohibited only if it presents a serious
menace to the well-being of others. The sense of revulsion felt by the average
person at the thought of homosexual acts 34 would not appear in itself to con-
28. Ptuxon, "Not As Other Men", 101 SOL. J. 735 (1957).
29. GREAT BRITAIN HOME OFFIcE, REPORT OF THE COmmITFEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OF-
FENCES AND PROSTITUTION ff 61 (1957) [hereinafter cited as WOLFENDEN REPORT].
30. See Williams, The Proper Scope and Function of the Criminal Law, 74 L.Q. REv.
76, 81 (1958) ; cf. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 464 (1952).
31. See DEVLIN 16; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUm. L. REv. 55, 68 (1933).
32. DE SAvITscu, HOMOSEXUALITY, TRANSVESTISM, AND CHANGE OF SEX 1 (1958)
[hereinafter referred to as Dr SAvITscH].
It would appear that sodomy, another form of gratifying the impulse, would be sus-
ceptible to the same analysis. Sodomy, however, is criminal regardless of secrecy and con- -
sent; unlike indecent behavior, see text at notes 7-14 supra, this has always been true.
See 2 BisHoP, CRIMINAL LAw § 1193 (9th ed. 1923) ; DESTY § 60(a). Sodomy was crim-
inal at common law not merely because it caused scandal or harmed public morals, but be-
cause it was "a crime against nature." CLARK, CRIMINAL LAW 421-22 (1915). However,
many modern marriage manuals imply or openly aver that various acts of sodomy are
acceptable means of gratification. See authorities discussed in Bowman & Engle, supra
note 22, at 297-99; see also, STONE & STONE, A MARIAGE MANUAL 215 (rev. ed. 1952).
Therefore, if the Rittenour decision is correct, sanctions against private consensual sodomy
may also warrant reexamination.
33. Archbishop of Canterbury quoted in CHESSER 58. See also WOLFENDEN REPORT
164.
34. See Bowman & Engle, supra note 22, at 304 (survey shows deeper feelings of dis-
gust towards homosexuality than any other subject) ; Ephraim v, $tate, 82 Fla. 93, 95, 89
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stitute that grave threat. Although little is known about the impact of such
disgust, 35 it is probably occasional and fleeting, and not so upsetting to signifi-
cant numbers that it interferes with their daily lives.3 6 Moreover, reliance on
the emotional criteria of disgust increases the risk that society may "interfere
unwisely. '3 7 American case law seems to have adopted this view and has
sought a social harm for support of criminal sanctions more direct and severe
than moral reprobation. 38
Four other socially harmful consequences of homosexual behavior have
been advanced as justifications for criminal sanctions against consensual homo-
sexual conduct: (1) the danger of children being seduced,3 9 (2) the harmful
impact on marriage relationships, 40 (3) the prevalence of tension among homo-
sexuals, 41 and (4) the possibility that such persons will not seek psychiatric
aid without the incentive of criminal sanctions.42 The contention that adults
So. 344, 345 (1921) ("loathsome"); Luevanos v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 623, 624, 252
S.W.2d 179 (1952) ("revolting").
35. Cf. Clinard, Secondary Conmunity Influences and Juvenile Delinquency, THE
PROBLEM OF DELINQUENCY 186, 195 (Glueck ed. 1959) (impact of obscene materials);
Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROa. 587, 594-95
(1955) (same).
36. But see DEVLIN: If "the man in the ... omnibus," id. at 16, experiences "a real
feeling of reprobation," id. at 17, the criminal law may intervene. Devlin's critics have de-
fined his test to be "what makes the man on the omnibus sick". E.g., Hart, supra note 24,
at 162-63. Although sarcastic, this definition clarifies the issue. Rather than get "sick," the
man in the omnibus probably returns, unaffected, to his newspaper.
Devlin has also implied that disgust is an indicator of danger to the moral code. DEVLIN
14, 17-18. The contrary would seem true. Chesser, for example, compares the emotional
reaction to homosexuality to the firmly entrenched feelings which discussion of racial or
religious issues may arouse in certain areas. CHESSER 15-16.
37. Archbishop of Canterbury, quoted in CHESSER 58.
38. In the following cases, the question was not should the state intervene, but could
it constitutionally do so. While recognizing a right to do so solely on the ground of pro-
tecting public morals, the courts consistently gave an additional justification involving a
more direct social benefit. L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 596 (1900) (restricting
prostitutes prevents vice from spreading) ; Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 165 (1900)
(Blue Law essential for physical well-being) ; Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 496
(1897) (lotteries "plundered the ignorant and simple") ; Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878) ("polygamy leads to the patriarchial principal, and . . . fetters
the people in stationary despotism") ; State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 563, 108 So. 2d 233, 234
(1959) (miscegenation causes "propagation of children who are burdened ... with a feel-
ing of inferiority") ; State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 425, 11 A.2d 856, 862 (1940) (anti-
contraception statute promotes well-being of family by discouraging extra-marital relations
and promotes "a maintenance and increase of population"). But see People v. Ring, 267
Mich. 657, 662, 255 N.W. 373, 374-75 (1934) (private social nudism prohibited because
"offiensive to the people of... Michigan").
39. Rees, Homosexuality and the Law, in REES & UsILL, THEY STAND APART 3, 28
(1955) ; see WOLFENDEN REPORT ff 53.
40. See, e.g., MATHEWS, Is HO o ExUALUTY A MENACE? 147-53 (1957) [hereinafter
referred to as MATHEWS].
41. See, e.g., MATHEWS 160-65; WILDEBLooD, AGAINST THE LAW 37 (1955) [herein-
after cited as WILDEBLooD].
42. See CHESSER 60-61.
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who commit homosexual acts will eventually seduce children has been rejected
by virtually all medical and legal authorities.4 3 Pederasty-the urge for sexual
gratification with children-is distinct from homosexuality and no more pre-
valent among homosexuals than among others." While consensual homosexual
behavior has also been condemned as incompatible with marriage, the homo-
sexual impulse is not "voluntarily" chosen, and criminal prohibition of overt
acts will probably not lessen it.4 5 Moreover, the impulse, not its expression,
creates the incompatibility; authorities warn that a marriage undertaken in
the hope of curing homosexual desire is likely to be an unhappy one or end in
divorce. 40 Similarly, although homosexuals may be unusually tense or neurotic,
this is not attributable to expression of their desires, but rather to the clash
between social sanctions and the underlying impulse.47 Further restraint
through criminal prohibitions only intensifies the neurosis which the law is
invoked to prevent.4 8 Finally, the use of criminal punishment as an incentive
to obtain psychiatric aid is questionable, for with existing sanctions, 49 few
homosexuals seek such help. 0 And criminal sanctions may actually deter the
desire for cure by fostering rebellion.51 Moreover, since many psychiatrists
claim that the homosexual can only be taught to accept and live with his con-
dition,52 psychiatric aid may indirectly encourage violation of criminal penal-
ties.
43. E.g., WOLFENDEN REPORT ff 57; BERG, FEAR, PUNISHMENT, ANXIETY AND THE
WOLFENDEN REPORT 33 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as BERG] ; DE SAVITSCH 13-14;
CHESSER 34-35. It has even been maintained that criminal sanctions, with their accompany-
ing dangers of police undercover work and increased risk of blackmail, causes some homo-
sexuals, who would not otherwise do so, to use children in order to evade detection.
CHURCH OF ENGLAND REPORT 110; Puxon, supra note 28; see Hammelmann, Committee
on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, 21 MODERN L. REv. 68, 69 (1958).
44. See note 43 supra.
45. See, e.g., Glueck, An Evaluation of the Homosexual Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv.
187, 194-95 (1957) ; ALLEN, THE PROBLEM OF HOMOSEXUALITY 36-52 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as ALLEN]. Authorities conflict about whether the desire is hereditary, e.g., DE SAv-
ITscH 1, 16, or results from early childhood environmental factors, e.g., BERGLER, HoMO-
SEXUALITY: DISEASE OR WAY OF LIFE? 31 (1956).
46. E.g., XVOLFENDEN REPORT II 55; MERCER, THEY WALK IN SHADOW 40-41.
The instinct and its expression are often confused, resulting in the conclusion that pro-
hibition of acts will eliminate harmful consequences of the instinct. See CHURCH OF ENG-
LAND REPORT 25.
47. CHESSER 43. See CHURCH OF ENGLAND REPORT 33-35. But see Hailsham, Homo-
sexuality and Society, in REES & USILL, THEY STAND APART 21, 25 (1955) (due to use
of "non-complementary physical organs"). Some authorities deny that homosexuals are
unusually tense or unstable. E.g., MERCER 39.
48. See CHURCH OF ENGLAND REPORT 34, 109. See generally BERG 51-100.
49. Criminal law would appear to add little to the already severe social sanctions on
homosexuality. See Bowman & Engle, supra note 34.
50. CHESSER 61; WOLFENDEN REPORT f1 46.
51. See note 27 stpra.
52. Glueck, supra note 45, at 209; DE SAVITSCH 16; MERCER 39-40; CHESSER 61;
CHURCH OF ENGLAND REPORT 32; WILDEBLOOD 10. But see MATHEwS 116; BERGLER,
HOMOSEXUAUTY: DISEASE OR WAY OF LIFE? 187-260 (1956). Glueck has pointed out that
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Removal of criminal restrictions on consensual homosexual conduct has been
opposed on the additional ground that it will imply social approval of homo-
sexuality, and foster its spread.53 But disapproval of homosexuality is so
strongly embedded in our society, that abolition of criminal sanctions may not
weaken it,54 especially if accompanied by a legislative disclaimer of approba-
tion.55 Whether the absence of criminal sanctions will encourage the spread of
homosexuality is not certain. Observers have noted that the repeal of laws
penalizing homosexuality in Sweden has not produced a noticeable increase in
the incidence of such conduct.56 On the other hand, knowledge that the acivity
is lawful if voluntary may encourage the homosexual to seek consent where
he previously would not. Although increased solicitation will probably not
make homosexuality more attractive to the heterosexually inclined, 7 it may
lead to seduction of some persons who would have controlled their homosexual
inclinations had they not been solicited. 5 If solicitation were retained as a
criminal offense, however, solicitation of strangers might be deterred; the
homosexual would tend to confine his activities to other known homosexuals. 9
Admittedly, a successful solicitation would avoid the criminal sanction, defeat-
ing the aim of such a law; the statute would have to depend for its deterrent
effect on the risk that the stranger will complain, or that he or she will be a
police officer.
The argument in favor of retaining criminal prohibition of private consen-
sual homosexual behavior must also be balanced against a number of other
factors. There is, for example, doubt as to whether criminal censure can
appreciably deter expression of the homosexual desire.60 And if these sanc-
tions are unenforceable, they may engender cynicism toward law. 61 Moreover,
if the law's object is to teach the homosexual his condition is wrong, psychiatric treatment
may be quite inconsistent with this. Glueck, supra, at 209.
53. See DzvLix 18-19; WOLFENDEN REPORT j[ 54; CHESSER 32.
54. See note 34 supra.
55. See WOLFENDEN REPORT ff 61. Moreover, a person who is not criminally punished
by the law can still be denied its protection. EDWARDs 10-12; see Raider v. The DLxie Inn,
198 Ky. 152, 248 S.W. 229 (1923) (doctrine requiring innkeeper to admit all travelers not
applicable to prostitute) ; Paddock Bar, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
46 N.j. Super. 405, 134 A.2d 779 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (tavern catering to homosexuals
may have license revoked); Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 169
Cal. App. 2d 188, 337 P.2d 203 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ; Upfill v. Wright, [1911] 1 K.B.
506 (landlord who lets fiat for fornication may not recover his rent).
56. WOLFENDEN REPORT 59.
57. See id., f 58; CHaESSER 60-61.
58. See text at note 70, and see note 81 infra.
59. See MERcER 247.
60. BERG 16; PLOScowE 209 (six million acts for every 20 convictions). WOLFENDEN
REPoRT ff 41 n.1 (thirty thousand acts between males, aged 21-30, for every conviction),f[ 58. But see Schwartz, Book Review, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 914, 915-16 (1948).
61. Schwartz, supra note 60, has disagreed with those who analogize unenforceable
sex laws to liquor prohibition on the ground that violations of the former are secret, there-
fore, the law is not brought into public contempt. Id. at 916. However, he admits that in




prosecution itself often publicizes these otherwise secret activities, increasing
rather than curtailing the shocking effect on the public that the early laws were
intended to prevent.6 2 Finally, making mutually willing acts criminal encour-
ages enforcement methods which bring the police into disrepute. The police
conduct in the Rittenour case itself is an example.6 3
The legal consequences of such police conduct assume an importance of their
own in jurisdictions in which consensual homosexual behavior is a crime. 64
Entering a suspect's home under the guise of friendship for the purpose of
gathering incriminating evidence is probably not a violation of the search-and-
seizure prohibition of the fourth (and fourteenth) amendments.65 But the in-
ducement of a criminal act by implying willingness to submit may bar criminal
prosecution for the act induced, under the doctrine of "entrapment." This doc-
trine serves two functions-to prevent inducement into crime, 6 and a broader
but less generally accepted function, to keep police from falling "below stand-
ards to which common feelings respond."6 7 Courts have approved the tech-
62. See WILDEBLOOD 52-94, 184. See also PLOSCOWE 195; Note, 17 U. CHI. L. REv.
162, 173 (1949).
63. See also People v. Spaulding, 81 Cal. App. 615, 254 Pac. 614 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927)
(officer permitted act of sodomy to be performed upon himself before arresting suspect).
64. See note 19 mupra.
65. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (fourth amendment was not
violated when suspect's friend, wired for sound, entered his store and engaged him in an
incriminating conversation). Although the agent's sole purpose is to gather incriminating
evidence, his conduct is constitutional if it is voluntarily given. Ibid. Note, ILL. LAW
FORUm 649, 654 (1952). Compare Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 29S (1921) (evidence
seized by guest-officer after suspect left the house). But see People v. Dent, 371 Il. 33, 19
N.E.2d 1020 (1939), criticized in Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure,
52 Nw. L. REv. 46, 58-59 (1957). Even if the amendment did prohibit what occurred in
Rittenour, exclusion of evidence would be constitutionally required only when federal
agents were involved. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954). At the time of Wolf, seventeen states had adopted the federal exclu-
sionary rule and twenty states had rejected it. 338 U.S. at 29.
66. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). This theory is rationalized on the
ground that the legislature could not have intended that an innocent man be convicted
when his illegal act was the result of a police inducement. Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 444-49 (1932).
67. Sherman v. United States, note 66 supra, at 378-85 (concurring opinion). This
view is rationalized on the ground that a court has the power to preserve "the purity of
its own temple." Sorrells v. United States, note 66 supra, at 457 (concurring opinion).
Similar power is exercized to exclude confessions obtained by federal officers during illegal
delay in arraignment. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341, 347 (1943) ; see, e.g.,
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,
60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1112; Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1033 (1958). Critics argue that no such
power exists because acquittal, when the defendant's guilt is assumed, is tantamount to
pardon which is exclusively an executive prerogative. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S.
27, 42 (1916) ; see Sorrells v. United States, 57 F2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1932) (Parker,
J.), reversed on other grounds, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) ; Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrap-
ment In the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. Rxv. 245, 260-61 (1942) ; Note, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1333, 1334 (1960). But this overlooks the fact that a pardon is essentially an act of
forgiveness, see BARNHART, AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1951 ed.), while release
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nique of inducement when used to detect persistent violators 1S or those who
intend to commit crime. 69 But such practices may also lure "situational of-
fenders," those who have previously controlled inclinations to violate the law
and had no intention of committing a crime, until induced by a police officer.70
Courts experience "a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of
government to beguile innocent, though ductile, persons into lapses which they
might otherwise resist. 171 To distinguish between these two kinds of offenders,
courts applying the entrapment doctrine have tried to determine whether the
"criminal design" which resulted in the defendant's illegal behavior originated
with him or whether it was created by the police and implanted by them "in
the mind of an innocent person. '7 2
This distinction may be very difficult to apply in cases involving homosexual
offenses. As the test has developed, primarily in cases of greed 73 or violence,74
the origin of the criminal intent is determined by the nature of the police in-
ducement, defendant's reaction to it, and his "predisposition" to commit the
crime.75 Inducements similar in nature to that used in Ritten our have frequent-
under the "purity of the temple" concept is not based upon forgiveness but is only a means
to protect the court and curtail undesirable police activities. Sherman v. United States,
supra note 66, at 378 (concurring opinion). Of course the result, release of the suspect,
does not differ.
68. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) ; see, e.g., People v. Conrad,
102 App. Div. 566, 92 N.Y. Supp. 606 (Sup. Ct. 1905) (abortion) ; People v. Krivitzky,
168 N.Y. 182, 61 N.E. 175 (1901) (counterfeiting).
69. E.g., State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 87 S.E.2d 191 (1955) (attempted rape);
People v. Lanzit, 70 Cal. App. 498, 233 Pac. 816 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925) (attempt to com-
mit murder).
70. See ABRAHAMSEN, CRIME AND THE HUMAN MIND 94-95 (1944); Donnelly, supra
note 67, at 1113-14.
71. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.). See
United States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601, 604-06 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting) ;
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958) ; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 441 (1932) ; Robinson v. United States, 32 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1928) ; McDermett v.
United States, 98 A.2d 287, 289-90 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953) ; Guarro v. United States,
237 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; cf. Love v. People, 160 Ill. 501, 504-05, 43 N.E. 710,
711-12 (1896) ; Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 834 (6th Cir. 1942).
72. Sherman v. United States, supra note 71, at 372; Woo Wai v. United States, 223
Fed. 412, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1915) ; People v. Barkdoll, 36 Cal. App. 25, 28, 171 Pac. 440,
441 (Dist. Ct. App. 1918); State v. Mantis, 32 Idaho 724, 727-28, 187 Pac. 268, 269
(1920) ; Annot. 18 A.L.R. 146, 149 (1922) (citing cases) ; Annot. 66 A.L.R. 478, 482-83
(1930) (same) ; Annot. 86 A.L.R. 263, 265 (1933) (criminal intent originating in mind
of entrapping person).
73. People v. Malone, 117 Cal. App. 629, 4 P.2d 287 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (burglary);
State v. McKenzie, 182 Minn. 513, 235 N.W. 274 (1931) (extortion).
74. E.g., People v. Lanzit, 70 Cal. App. 498, 233 Pac. 816 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925) (at-
tempt to commit murder) ; State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 87 S.E.2d 191 (1955) (intent
to commit rape).
75. "On the one hand, at trial the accused may examine the conduct of the govern-
ment agent; and on the other hand, the accused will be subjected to an 'appropriate and
searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition' . . . ." Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. at 373.
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ly been held to raise the issue of entrapment, justifying remand to the court
below for a consideration of all three entrapment criteria. Appeals based on
impulses more powerful than "the ordinary expectation of gain," such as friend-
ship,76 sentiment,77 sympathy,78 pity,79 and even excessive wealth,80 have been
regarded as likely to entice the "innocent but ductile" as well as the guilty.
Generally, the impulse toward homosexuality is also more easily tempted and
difficult to control than avarice. 8' But this factor alone cannot lead to a finding
of entrapment, for by itself it does not distinguish the situational homosexual
offender from the persistent or ready homosexual. The suspect's reaction to
the enticement-whether he showed "ready complaisance"8 2 or reacted like an
experienced operator 8 3 -is not likely to be helpful. A situational homosexual
may accede readily if approached during a period of emotional stress when
control is difficult;84 on the other hand, the persistent violator may appear
hesitant if aware of police investigations.8 5 Reliance on the suspect's "modus
operandi" is also a doubtful indicator. Because the offender in most entrap-
ment cases is probably arrested after the first approach,86 there is little basis
for evaluating the suspect's experience. Nor will nervousness of the situational
offender distinguish him from the recidivist who may appear equally unsure
because of sexual excitement. Finally, "predisposition" as a criteria of entrap-
ment has undesirable consequences because it is usually proven by general
reputation and prior convictions.8 7 Since the jury might weigh reputation evi-
dence into its decision on guilt of the specific offense charged, introduction of
prior convictions on the issue of "predisposition" tends to put the suspect on
trial for his former behavior and to ignore the possibility of his subsequent
76. Silk v. United States, 16 F.2d 568, 569 (8th Cir. 1926) ; Lutfy v. United States,
198 F.2d 760, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1952).
77. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (army comrades).
78. Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993, 994 (5th Cir. 1933) ; Hunter v. United States,
62 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1932); United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429, 430 (N.D. Ga.
1925).
79. United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927).
80. Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 834 (6th Cir. 1942).
81. "In homosexuality we have an instinct which is infinitely more powerful than any
instinct of greed." DE SAVITscH 35. Many homosexuals who make a bona-fide attempt to
stay within the law experience "the greatest difficulty in sublimating their instinctive im-
pulses" and "only maintain (continence) by a perpetual, tormenting struggle." CHESSER 36.
In dealing with homosexuals, courts have recognized how easily the police may "tor-
ment and tease weak men beyond their power to resist." McDermett v. United States, 98
A.2d 287, 290 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953) ; Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 581
(D.C. Cir. 1956).
82. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933).
83. See Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1333, 1339 (1960).
84. See CHURCH OF ENGLAND REPORT 34; WOLFENDEN REPORT f[ 23; PLoscowE 205.
85. The government has made this very claim in attempting to prove that a suspect
who hesitates is nevertheless an experienced operator ready and willing to commit the
crime. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958).
86. But see People v. Spaulding, 81 Cal. App. 615, 254 Pac. 614 (1927).
87. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958) (concurring opinion).
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reform. 8 On the whole, therefore, the traditional criteria of entrapment do not
provide an acceptable means of identifying situational homosexual offenders.
Since this group is quite large among homosexuals,8 9 a more restrictive test of
entrapment must be adopted in such cases.
A more suitable standard would be the requirement that police investigative
work in this area be passive. Courts should permit conviction for homosexual
attempts made on police officers only if the suspect solicits or accosts an officer
who has in no way encouraged him." This "active-passive inducement" crite-
rion is not without precedent; it has been expressly applied to police induce-
ment of crimes requiring lack of consent, such as burglary,9 1 larceny and rob-
bery,92 and indecent assault by homosexuals. 93 The few cases involving sexual
crimes in which consent is irrelevant seem to have employed the older three-
part entrapment criterion, but these cases do not preclude use of the narrower
"active-passive" test. None have faced the issue squarely, for in all but one
case the suspect had initiated the suggestion without any active police entice-
ment.9 4 Although requiring passivity may result in fewer convictions of per-
sistent violators and weaken the deterrent effect of undercover work, it will
more reliably accomplish the two basic functions of the entrapment doctrine.
88. See id. at 383 (concurring opinion) ; United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160,
162 (D. Neb. 1927) ; Donnelly, note 67 supra, at 1108; Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1333, 1339
(1960); Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1033, 1038 (1958).
89. See, e.g., WOLFENDEN REPORT f111 21-24; PLOScowE 206. The increased possibility
that police may overstep their bounds is recognized in Bowman & Engle, A Psychiatric
Evaluation of the Laws of Homosexuality, 29 TEMPLE L.Q. 273, 305 (1956).
90. Unlike the existing entrapment test, this criteria focuses solely upon the nature of
the police conduct. The concurring Justices in Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378-85, advocated con-
centration upon this factor because they conceived the function of the entrapment doctrine
to be enforcement of acceptable police standards. However, the "active-passive induce-
ment" concept is primarily proposed here because the existing test fails to perform the
more accepted function of the entrapment doctrine, protecting the innocent from induce-
ment into crime. See notes 66-72 supra and accompanying text.
91. Compare Love v. People, 160 Ill. 501, 43 N.E. 710 (1896) (active), with Thomp-
son v. State, 18 Ind. 386 (1862) (passive).
92. Compare Connor v. People, 18 Colo. 373, 33 Pac. 159 (1893) (active "suggestion"
and "instigation"), and Williams v. State, 55 Ga. 391 (1875) (active "solicitation"), with
People v. Hanselman, 76 Cal. 460, 18 Pac. 425 (1888) (passive "submission").
93. Compare Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (active), and
McDermett v. United States, 98 A.2d 287 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953) (active), with
Dyson v. United States, 97 A.2d 135 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953) (passive).
94. Ditton v. State, 222 Ind. 25, 51 N.E.2d 356 (1943) (suspect telephoned prosecut-
ing witness) ; People v. Spaulding, 81 Cal. App. 615, 254 Pac. 614 (1927) (although agent's
subsequent behavior may have been enticing, suspect made initial suggestion) ; cf. State
v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 87 S.E.2d 191 (1955) (assault with intent to commit rape, old
entrapment criteria applied).
In the other case, active police inducement was found to constitute entrapment. State
v. Mantis, 32 Idaho 724, 187 Pac. 268 (1920) (held defendant entrapped when prosecut-
ing witness, at district attorney's request, made original suggestion that defendant estab-
lish illicit relationship with her).
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Prevention of disreputable police activities will preserve the dignity of law
enforcement agencies, and the situational homosexual offender will be pro-
tected from inducement into crime.95
95. One other problem of the current entrapment test will not be so readily cured by
adoption of the "active-passive inducement" criteria. Because the homosexual will act only
when he and the agent are alone, requiring a corroborating witness would prevent effective
undercover work. See Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Seitner
v. United States, 143 A.2d 101 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 710
(D.C. Cir. 1958) ; cf. Note, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 744 (1953). Compare State v. Madrid, 74
Idaho 200, 259 P.2d 1044 (1953), with People v. Troutman, 187 Cal. 313, 201 Pac. 928
(1921). But conflicting testimony may occur, cf., Seitner v. United States, supra, and the
claim has been made that police often lie in such circumstances, WILDEBLOOD 66. See also
Kubie, Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 59, 60, 61, 67 (1950). Courts, therefore, must be particularly alert in checking
testimony for discrepancies and weighing it in the light of the conditions under which the
act transpired. See Kelly v. United States, .supra at 152-54.
Appendix: STATE STATUTES REGULATING "LEwDNESS" AND "INDECENCY."
ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 368 (1959), tit. 7, § 1091 (Supp. 1960) ; ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-652 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3202 (1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. 8§ 53-216
to 53-220 (1958) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 731-32 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.01-
.03 (1944); HAWAII REV. LAWS 267-11 (1952); Ky. REv. STAT. § 436-075 (1953); ME.
CODE ANN. ch. 134, § 12 (1954) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 35 (1956) ; MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.570 (1954); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 579:3, 9 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. 8
2A:115-1 (1953) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-34-1 (1953) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1 (1953);
N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2214 (1943); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.27 (Page 1953); OxLA.
STAT. AN. tit. 21, § 1029 (1958) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-34-5 (1957) ; S.C. CODE
§ 16-409(7) (1952); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-91 (1959).
Twenty-four states have statutes which still expressly require "openness" or publicity:
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-15 (1954); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02 (1941); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-6101 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAws § 267-1 (1955); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 159(a) (1957) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.1 (1946) ; KANSAS GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-908
(1949) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 14.106 (1951) ; ME. CODE ANN. ch. 134, § 5 (1954); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 16 (1956) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.567 (1954) ; MINN. STAT. ANN.
617.23 (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.150 (1953); NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.210 (1956);
N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2201 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 22 (1950); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 167.155 (1959) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4519 (1945) ; UTAH CODE AiiN. § 76-
39-1 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2601 (1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. 18.1-.193 (1960) ;
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.120 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6059 (1955); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 944.20 (1958). Of these twenty-four states, seven-Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Mass-
achusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, and Oklahoma-have additional statutes, .upra, which
are silent about these requirements, and the phrasing of the Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
and Nevada statutes is such that "openness" may not be required for all of the acts indict-
able under these statutes. See People v. Smith, 231 Mich. 221, 203 N.W. 869 (1925). Ten-
nessee has no statute, but has adopted the common-law crime of "open lewdness." Brooks
v. State, 10 Tenn. 482 (1831) ; Grisham v. State, 10 Tenn. 589 (1831).
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